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ABSTRACT
This study examines the reasons for changes in the realexchange rate
between the dollar and the German mark from thebeginning of the floating rate
regime in 1973 through 1984. The econometric analysis focuseson the effects
of anticipated structural budget deficits andmonetary policy in the United
States and Germany and the changes in U.S.profitability induced by changes -in
tax rules. The possible impact of a number of othervariables is also
examined.
The evidence indicates that the rise in theexpected future defic-its in
the budget of the U.S. government has had apowerful effect on the exchange
rate between the dollar and the German mark. Eachone percentage point
increase in the ratio of future budget deficits to GNPincreased the exchange
rate by about 30 percentage points. Changes in thegrowth of the money supply
also affect the exchange rate. Changes in the tax rulesand in the inflation-
tax interaction that altered the corporate demand for fundsdid not have any
discernible effect on the exchange rate.
A separate analysis confirms that there is anequilibrium structural
relation between the dollar-DM rates in the United Statesand Germany. An
increase of one percentage point in the real interestrate differential has
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The dramatic surge in the dollar's value relative to major European
currencies was probably the most important economic event of the period
between 1980 and 1984. The dollar's value rose from 1.8 German marks in
mid-1980 to a peak of more than 3.3 marks in February 1985. More generally,
the multilateral trade-weighted real value of the dollar rose by 70 percent
between 1980 and the first quarter of 1985.
The rise of the dollar produced an unprecedented merchandise trade
deficit that increased to three percent of GNP by 1985, hurting a wide range
of American industries and creating a political receptivity to protectionism
that still threatens to reverse the progress of the past half century -in
liberalizing world trade. The trade deficit and the associated current
account deficit transformed the United States from a net capital exporter in
1980 to a country that by 1984 had a large enough capital inflow to finance
55 percent of the nation's total net fixed investment. In addition, the sharp
rise in the dollar not only increased Americans' real incomes but also
contributed significantly to the decline of inflation.'
In Europe and Japan, exports rose sharply and the current account moved
into substantial surplus; for the European Economic Community as a whole, the
trade balance with the rest of the world improved by more than $50 billion
between 1980 and 1984. But at the same time, the rise -in the dollar induced
foreign central banks to increase their interest rates in order to prevent
their currencies from falling even further.2 On balance, despite the increase—2-
-in exports, the induced rise in interest rates may have depressed aggregate
demand in Europe by enough to make the dollar's rise a net contributor to the
stubbornly high level of unemployment.
The present study focuses on the real exchange rate between the dollar
and the German mark from the beginning of the floating exchange rate regime in
1973 through 1984. The mark is not only very important in its own right but
is representative of the exchange rate between the dollar and the other
European countries since the mark is the dominant currency in the European
Monetary System.
1.Alternative Explanations of the Dollar's Rise
The basic cause of the dollar's sharp increase still remains a very
contentious subject.I have argued since 1982 that the dollar's rise could be
traced primarily to the increase in current and expected structural deficits
in the federal budget and to the shift to an anti-inflationary monetary
policy.3 This view was also elaborated in the Economic Reports of the
President for 1983 and 1984.
Increases in the federal budget deficit raise real long—term interest
rates and these higher rates attract funds to the United States. The dollar's
rise is necessary to create the trade deficit and associated current account
deficit that permits the desired net inflow of foreign capital. Moreover, to
achieve portfolio equilibrium, the dollar must rise by enough so that its
expected future fall just offsets the nominal yield differential between
dollar securities and foreign assets. This is discussed in Branson (1985) and—3—
Frenkel and Razin (1984). The budget deficitmay also raise the dollar more
directly by changing the relative demand for U.S. andforeign goods (Dornbusch,
1983 and Obstfeldt, 1985).
The effect on the dollar of the rising level ofstructural budget
deficits was reinforced by the change inmonetary policy that began in October
1979. The contractionary shift of Federal Reservepolicy caused a short—term
spike in real interest rates that temporarily increased theattractiveness of
dollar securities. More fundamentally, thenew Federal Reserve policy also
caused a more sustained increase in the confidence ofinvestors world—wide
that the value of the dollar would not soon beeroded by a return to rising
inflation in the United States. This reduction in therisk of dollar
investments reinforced the attractiveness causedby the deficit-induced rise
in the expected real interest rate.
Other economists and policy officials have offeredquite different
explanations of the rise in the dollar. The EconomicReport of the president
for 1985 concludes that the most importantreason for the rise in the dollar
between 1980 and 1982 was the rise in the after-taxreturn on new business
investment caused by the combination of the EconomicRecovery and Tax Act of
1981 and the reduced rate of inflation. The tightmoney policy is also seen as
a cause of the dollar's rise in this period. But the authorsconclude that
although expanding budget deficits in this period "may also haveraised the
level of U.S. real interest rates and helped tostrengthen the dollar ....the
extent of upward pressure on real interest rates andon the dollar through
this channel is uncertain, and numerous studies have failedto uncover
significant effects" (page 105).-4-
The IpQ±s authors also note that after 1982 the differential between
U.S. 3-month real interest rates and a trade-weighted average of 3-month real
interest rates in six other industrial countries (calculated using OECD
inflation forecasts) narrows to zero and is occasionally negative. They
conclude from this that "other factors have continued to push up the demand
for dollar assets" and suggest that the dollar's strength since 1982 has been
due to "the combination of increased after-tax profitability of U.S.
corporations, demonstrated strength of the U.S. recovery, reversal of
international lending outflow from U.S. banks, and generally more favorable
longer run prospects for the U.S. economy... ."(pages105-06).
Another commonly expressed opinion is that the rise in the dollar since
the summer of 1980 reflected growing confidence in the United States as a
"safe haven" for investments by foreigners who believed that the election of
Ronald Reagan would make their assets safer in the United States than elsewhere
in the world. There is also the view, identified most strongly with Ronald
McKinnon (e.g., 1984), that the strong dollar does not reflect any "real"
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butis solely an indication that monetary policy in the United States is too
tight.
At a more fundamental level, any role for the budget deficit in
explaining the rise of the dollar must be rejected by those economists who
believe that deficits do not raise real interest rates because they induce an
equal offsetting rise in private saving (e.g., Barro, 1974). Evans (1985)
extended the procedure of Plosser (1982) to study the relation between
unexpected changes in budget deficits and the dollar and concluded the dollar—5,-
exchange rate is not affected by changes in thebudget deficit.I return
below to the deficiencies of thistype of analysis.
Although there may be some element of truth -in each ofthe alternative
explanations of the dollar's rise, my own judgment isthat they are not as
important as the increase in expected structuralbudget deficits and the shift
to a less inflationary monetary
strategy. This is supported by the
econometric evidence presented in sections 4through 6 below. The estimated
effects of the expected deficits and of therate of growth of the money supply
are economically important and statisticallysignificant. In contrast, the
increase in profitability induced by the taxchanges in the first half of the
1980s did not have a significant effecton the exchange rate in the equations
presented below. The strong statistical evidence ofa link between the
expected structural budget deficits and the value of the dollaris direct
evidence against the Barro hypothesis thatbudget deficits have no real
impact. The implied impact of the expectedbudget deficits also contradicts
the McKinnon hypothesis that the rise of thedollar was due only to a tight
monetary policy.
Before turning to that econometric evidence, it isuseful to consider
some further reasons for rejecting thearguments of those who claim that
neither increased real interest rates norbudget deficits was responsible for
the dollar's rise.
The evidence presented in The 1985 EconomicReport of the President (and
elsewhere) that there is no longer a difference between the3-month real
-interest rate in the United States and in otherindustrial countries is
essentially irrelevant since the theory implies that theequilibrium relation-6--
between the exchange rate and the difference in long-term real rates is much
larger than the relation with the difference in short-term real rates.It is
easy to see why this is true. Consider the situation in which the U.S.3-month
real rate is four percentage points above the 3-month rate on foreign
securities but there is no interest differential for intervals beginning after
three months. Thus the six-month interest rates differ by only two percentage
points, the one-year rates differ by 1 percentage point, etc. The value of
the dollar can be 1 percentage point above its equilibrium value since the
interest rate differential is enough to compensate for a one percent decline
-in the dollar, regardless of whether this happens in 3 months, 6 months, a
year or longer. But with the differential in real rates concentrated onlyin
the 3-month maturity, any greater overvaluation of the dollar would imply an
expected future decline not compensated by the difference in interest rates.
In contrast, consider the situation in which the real interest rate on
the U.s. io year bond is 4 percentage points above the real yield on foreign
10 year bonds with no interest differential for intervals after 10 years. Then
the real value of the dollar can fall by 4 percent a year for 10 years and
still leave an investor indifferent between having purchased dollar bonds and
foreign bonds. This implies that a 4 percent real interest differential on 10
year bonds can support a 48 percent initial overvaluation of the dollar.
It is noteworthy therefore that although the 3-month real yield
differential reached zero by the end of 1982 and hovered around that level
thereafter, the long—term real interest differential at the end of 1983 was in
the range of two to four percentage points, depending on the method of
forecasting future inflation.4 The observed real interest differential was—7—
therefore quite consistent with the observed rise in the dollar's real value.
I will return below to the more formal evidence on the link between the dollar
and the real interest differential.
While the change in U.S. monetary policy after October 1979may have
reduced the inflation risk in U.S. fixed income securities, the notion that
the dollar rose -in the 1980s because the United States capital market -isa
political safe haven for foreign funds seems doubtful. Although the U.S. does
offer a politically safe environment, it is hard to see a rise in U.S.
political stability vis—a-vis Switzerland or other major countries between the
late 1970s and the early 1980s. Moreover, if there had been a shift in the
worldwide portfolio demand -in favor of U.S. assets, U.S. interest rates would
have declined. The sharp rise in real rates suggests thatany "safe haven"
increase -in the demand for dollar assets was overwhelmed by the increased
supply of those assets. It is also doubtful that the declines of 25 percent
or more between February 1985 and February 1986 in the value of the dollar
relative to the German mark, the Swiss franc, and the Japaneseyen reflects
any deterioration -in the relative political stability and security of the
United States.
Those who point to the reduced lending of U.S. banks to the Latin
American debtor nations after the fall of 1982 as an example of the safe
haven effect misconstrue the portfolio effect of that lending. That change in
lending did not represent a change in U.S. demand for assets denominated in
foreign currencies since those loans were all denominated in dollars.
Moreover, the loan proceeds were used by the borrowers either to purchase
imports or, through capital flight, to make deposits or purchase assets in the—8-
United States.
There are two problems with the argument that the dollar rose because
the strength of the recovery attracted investments seeking to share in U.S.
profitability. First, the real value of the dollar rose through the recessions
of 1980 and 1981 and was 36 percent higher at the trough of the second
recession (in the final quarter of 1982) than it had been in 1980. Real
interest rates and projected budget deficits were rising during this period
even though the econmy was sagging. Second, most of the capital inflow to the
United States was in the form of bank deposits or purchases of short-term
fixed income securities and only about one—third was in the form of portfolio
equity purchases or direct investment. In 1982 and 1983 combined, there was a
$192 billion increase in foreign private assets in the United States but
direct investments were only $27 billion and stock purchases were only $33
billion.
In short, there are good reasons to reject the arguments of those who say
that the dollar's rise cannot be due to higher real rates because the interest
differential disappeared long ago and who attribute the dollar's rise to the
attractiveness of U.S. financial markets as a safe haven for foreign investors
and as a place in which equity investments can participate in the profitable
recovery. Although the improved tax climate for investment should in
principle have raised the value of the dollar, the evidence presented below
indicates that this effect is too weak to discern statistically.
The study by Evans (1985) is unpersuasive for a quite different reason.
Evans' basic procedure is to relate quarterly movements -in the exchange rate
to the quarterly "surprises" in the deficit, in government spending, in—9—
monetary policy, etc. These "surprises" are calculated as the residuals from
vector autoregression predictions of the deficit and othervariables. The
fundamental problem with this procedure is that itassumes that the deficit
variable that might influence the exchange rate is theconcurrent deficit when
theory implies that it is the sequence of expected future deficits that
influences the long-term real interest rate and theexchange rate.5 There is
no reason for the surprises in actual current quarterly deficitsto be related
to the expected future deficits6
Finally, the evidence presented below supports the importance of the
increased budget deficits as the primary cause of the rise inthe dollar and
thereby refutes both the Ricardian-equivalence proposition thatbudget
deficits have no real effects and the position of McKinnon andothers who
attribute all of the dollar's rise to tightmonetary policy in the United
States.
2.Studies of the Dollar andtheInterest Differential
With the exception of the study by Evans (1985) referred toabove, the
empirical research on the determination of exchange rates has focusedon the
relation between the exchange rate and the real interest differential.7
Although the equilibrium relation between the exchange rate and the interest
differential is a fundamental characteristic of portfolio balance inforeign
exchange markets (Dornbuscn, 1976; Frankel, 1979), there are four serious
problems in estimating an equation relating the exchange rate to the real
interest differential in order to understand the causes of variationsin the—10-
real exchange rate and, more specifically, to assess the role of the budget
deficit as a cause of changes in the exchange rate.
First, the critical interest rate variable is very difficult to measure
with any accuracy. The difference in real long—term interest rates is equal
to the difference in nominal long-term interest rates minus the difference in
expected long—term inflation rates. It is clearly very difficult to measure
with any accuracy the difference between the long-term expected inflation
rates in the two countries. These expectations depend not only on the history
of inflation in the two countries but also on the credibility of government
and central bank policies. The critical real interest differential is
therefore subject to substantial measurement error that will tend to bias the
coefficient toward zero and to reduce the statistical significance of its
effect.8
Second, changes -in the level of the real interest rate in each country
reflect changes in the risk premium required to get investors to hold the debt
denominated in that currency. These changes reflect variations in the
perceived risk of fluctuations in the interest rate and the exchange rate as
well as variations in the relative quantities of the assets denominated in
that currency. An increase in the level of the real interest rate due to a
change in the risk premium can occur with no change in the exchange rate.
Third, the real interest rates in the two countries are endogenous
variables, responding to changes in the exchange rate in a way that causes the
direct structural effect of the interest rates on the exchange rate to be
underestimated. Thus, a strong dollar implies a reduction in net exports
which depresses aggregate demand in the United States and therefore tends to—11--
lower the U.S. real interest rate. In addition, thestrong dollar reduces U.S.
net exports, thereby increasing the net capital inflow to the UnitedStates;
the increase in the current and projected net capital inflow alsotends to
lower U.S. real interest rates. The stronger dollarmay at times induce a
more lax monetary policy than would otherwise prevail, temporarilyreducing
the real interest rate. These inverse effects of the dollaron the level of
interest rates attentuates the measured direct effect of the interestrate on
the level of the dollar.
An increase in the dollar—DM ratio also tends to raise the realinterest
rate in Germany through the same three channels that cause it to lower the
U.S. real interest rate. The weaker mark increases economicactivity in
Germany and this raises the real interest rate. The current and projected
outflow of capital from Germany that accompanies the tradesurplus raises the
equilibrium real interest rate. And recent experience indicates thata fear
of the inflationary consequences of a declining mark caused theBundesbank to
tighten monetary policy as the mark fell relative to the dollar.9
In the econometric estimates of the relation between theexchange rate
and the interest rate presented in section 6 below, I usean instrumental
variables procedure that treats the interest differential asendogenous. The
instrumental variables are the budget deficits of the twocountries, the past
growth of the monetary base and the past rates of inflation. The use of the
instrumental variable procedure may also reduce the bias that results fromthe
difficulty of measuring expected inflation. However, despite its desirable
large sample properties, the instrumental variable procedure is of only
limited comfort with the small sample available in thepresent study.—12--
In addition to the statistical problems of estimating the direct effect
of exogenous shifts in the real interest differential on the exchange rate,
there is the more fundamental issue that evidence on the dollar's response to
changes in the real interest rate does not resolve the issue of the relative
importance of changes in the budget deficit, in tax policy and in monetary
policy. Although that could in principle be obtained by estimating a separate
equation relating the real interest rate to the budget deficit, tax and
monetary variables,10 that two—equation specification implicitly assumes that
these variables affect the exchange rate only through the real interest
differential. At a minimum, changes in monetary, tax and budget policies may
affect the expected rate of inflation and the uncertainty about future real
interest rates in ways that are not captured by the measured values of the
real interest rates. In addition, as Oornbusch (1983) has noted, the budget
deficit can have a direct effect through the relative demand for domestic and
foreign goods.
The present paper therefore focuses on estimating a reduced form
specification that relates the dollar-DM exchange rate to four key variables:
expected future budget deficits; tax-induced changes -in the profitability of
investment in plant and equipment; past inflation; and changes in monetary
policy. The specification is also extended to include other variables such as
the net U.S. stocks of international investment and the rate of growth of real
GNP. A dummy variable is also used to evaluate whether the dollar's exchange
value was higher in the period 1980-84 for some other unmeasured reason like
an increased attractiveness of the United States as a "safe haven" for foreign
funds or international investors' greater faith in the Reagan administration.—13--
In addition to these reduced form equations, thepaper also reports estimates
of equations relating the dollar-DM exchange rate toa measure of the real
interest rate differential, using an instrumental variableprocedure to reduce
the statistical bias that might otherwise result from theendogeneity of the
interest rates and the errors of measurement.
The next section describes these key variables and theirconstruction in
more detail. The estimated equations are then discussed andpresented in
sections 4 and 5.
3.The Key Variables of a Reduced Form Specif ion
The dependent variable of the equations presented below isthe real
exchange rate between the dollar and the German mark calculatedas the nominal
exchange rate multiplied by the ratio of the GNP deflators. Theexchange rate
is stated as the number of German marksper U.S. dollar; a rise of the
dependent variable is thus a rise in the real value of the dollar.
The key variables of the reduced form specification describedabove
cannot be observed directly but must be constructed. Thecurrent section
describes the rationale for these variables and theway that they have been
constructed for the current study. The regression equationsreported in the
next sections are estimated with annual observations for theperiod 1973
through 1984. The analysis uses annual observations becausequarterly or
monthly observations on variables like the expected future budget deficitsand
the tax—induced changes in profitability wouldprobably contain much more
measurment error with little or no increase -in actual information.-14--
3.1 Expected U.S. Budget Deficits
It -is the path of expected future budget deficits rather than simply the
current year's deficit that influences the level of real interest rates and
the exchange rate. In 1983 testimony (Feldstein, 1983) I emphasized this link
of the exchange rate to expected future budget deficits as follows:
That is the essential explanation of the strong dollar: the
high real long-term interest rate in the United States, combined
with the sense that dollar investments are relatively safe and that
American inflation will remain low, induces investors world wide to
shift in favor of dollar securities. Moreover, the unusually high
real long-term interest rate here relative to the real rates abroad
is now due primarily to the low projected national savings rate
caused by the large projected budget deficits [emphasis added].
To clarify the importance of the long—term projected deficits rather than
just the current year's deficit, I noted:
Net national saving fell from its customary 7 percent of GNP to only
1.5 percent of GNP -in 1982 and L5 percent of GNP in the first three
quarters of 1983. Moreover, and of particular importance in this
context, the large budget deficits that are projected for the next
five years and beyond -if no legislative action is taken means that
our net national saving rate will continue to remain far below the
previous level.
If government borrowing is high for only a single year, the additional
government debt can be absorbed by temporarily displacing private investment
with little effect on long-term interest rates. In contrast, the expected
persistence of budget deficits in the future implies a larger increase in the
stock of debt that must be sold to the private sector and a persistent
displacement of private investment that must be achieved to accommodate the
government's borrowing. Future budget deficits also mean future increases in—15--
potential aggregate demand that will lead to higher future short-term
interest rates and therefore to higher current long—term rates. All of these
considerations imply that the dpilar exchange rate should be more sensitive to
expected future deficits rather than to the current year's budget deficit.
Blanchard (1985) emphasized the importance of expected future deficits in
the determination of current long-term interest rates and Frenkel and Razin
(1984, 1986) and Branson (1985) emphasized the importance of expected future
deficits in exchange rate determination.
The expected persistence of structural budget deficits also increases the
risk that political pressures will lead to an inflationary monetary policy.
To this extent, expected high future deficits may raise nominal interest rates
but reduce the exchange value of the dollar by making dollar—denominated fixed
income securities more risky.
Neither of the studies that explicitly look at budget deficits considers
the expected sequence of future budget deficits.I have already commented on
the fact that Evans' (1985) procedure is based on the difference between the
budget deficit in the current quarter and the deficit predicted by a VAR
equation for the current quarter. There is no attention to expected future
deficits. Hooper's (1985) analysis is also in terms of the current quarter's
budget deficit with no attention to expected future deficits. As a result, I
am not inclined to give any weight to Evan's negative conclusion or to
Hooper's conclusion that budget deficits had only a small effect on the dollar
exchange rate.
The variable used in this study to represent the anticipated future
budget deficit (DEFEX) is an estimate of the average ratio of the budget-16-
deficit to GNP for five future years. Since the five-year deficit forecast is
used as a proxy for the long—term expected deficit, it is appropriate to
eliminate the cyclical component of the deficit and focus on the structural
component of the deficit relative to an estimate of potential or
full-employment GNP. The structural deficit is calculated from theobserved
or projected deficit and an estimate of the difference betweenthe actual GNP
and potential GNP. The details of this calculations and of the derivation of
potential GNP are described in Feldstein (1986b).
Although five year forecasts of the deficit and of GF'IP have been made
in recent years, they are not available for the entire sample period. The
analysis therefore assumes that, for the years for which it is observable,the
actual deficit and the actual GNP are the best estimates of the values that
financial market participants previously anticipated. For the years 1985 and
beyond, the expected deficit and expected GNP is measured by the projections
published in July 1985 by Data Resources, Inc. The Data Resourcesdeficit
projections reflect anticipated policy developments as well as existing taxand
spending rules; they are therefore taken as an indication of the viewof
sophisticated financial market participants. The actual and projected
deficits are then adjusted to obtain structural deficits and full-employment
GNP. Mote that this implies that for recent years the expected deficit
variable is a combination of actual deficits and projected deficits; e.g., the
1983 expected future deficit variable includes the observed deficit and GNP
variables for 1983 and 1984 but the ORI projections for 1985 through 1987.
The anticipated deficit variable has been constructed in a way that, as
far as possible, avoids discretionary decisions in order to eliminate anysuspicion that the deficit variable has been modified to obtain a variable
that can explain the variations in the exchange rate. Avoiding discretioncan,
however, lead to implausible assumptions and several people commenting on an
earlier draft of this paper indicated that they were concerned about the
implication that the financial markets anticipated the unprecedented growth of
budget deficits in the 1980s even before the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan and
the presentation of his 1981 budget.
I have therefore constructed an alternative expected deficit variable
that differs from the standard expected deficit variable for theyears 1977
through 1980. For those years, the alternative expected five-year average
deficit ratio is calculated by assuming that the 1980 ratio of structural
deficit to GNP persists. For example, the five—year average for 1978 consists
an average of the deficit-GNP ratios for 1978, 1979 and 1980 with 1980
getting 60 percent of the weight. This variable will be denoted DEFALT for
"alternativet' deficit variable. The empiricaT analysis shows that
substituting this for my standard expected deficit variable improves the
explanatory power of the equation but does not alter the estimated
coefficient.
3.2 Expected German Budget Deficits
Although the exchange rate between the dollar and the German mark might
at first seem to depend symmetrically on the budget deficits of the United
States and Germany, this is only true if the two countries are symmetric in
all other relevant ways. There are, however, two major differences between
the U.S. and Germany that imply that changes -in German deficits have smaller-18-
effects on the exchange rate than changes in U.S. deficits.
First, the German economy is less than one-third the size of the U.S.
economy. An increase in the German deficit by one-percent of GNPis therefore
only one-third as large as a one-percent of GNP deficit increase in the United
States.
More important, the close links among the European economies, now
formalized by the European Monetary System, means that European investors will
frequently act as if exchange rates among the major European countries are
fixed. To the extent that this is true, what matters is not the change in the
German budget deficit as a percentage of German GNP but the change in the
combined European (or EMS) budget deficits as a percentage of the combined
GNPs of those countries. Although this idea will be the subject of further
attention in a future study, the current paper uses only the ratio of the
German budget deficit to German GNP.
The German expected deficit-GNP ratio variable (OEFEXG) is constructed to
be as close as possible in concept to the U.S. expected deficit variable
although differences inevitably remain. The basic source of the data is an
OECD study of structural budget deficits (Price and Muller, 1984) that
provides estimates of the ratio of the structural budget deficit to potential
GNP for each year from 1973 through 1984. Forecasts for 1985 and 1986 are
obtained from the OECD Economic Outlook for December 1985. For the years
through 1982, these data can be used to construct a five-year average by
assuming that financial markets expected the deficit-GNP ratios that were
subsequently observed (or, for 1985 and 1986, that were subsequently forecast
by the OECD). For 1983 and 1984, we lack the necessary forecasts of the—19—
deficit—GNP ratio in the more distant future; we thereforeassume that
investors project the deficit-GNP ratio at the 1984 level.
It should be noted that there is a serious problem indefining the
structural deficit f or Germany since the German unemployment rate(defined to
approximate U.S. standards) rose from less than 1 percent in 1973 tonearly 8
percent in 1984. There is substantial controversy about how much of this
increase is cyclical and how much is structural.Although the present
analysis adopts the deficit implicit in the OECD measure of the structural
deficit, it is clear that there is substantial possible error in this
variable.
3.3 Tax-induced Changes in Profitability
The after-tax profitability of new corporate investments inplant and
equipment determines the corporate demand for funds. If the domesticsupply of
funds to the corporate sector is relatively inelastic,an increase in the
corporate demand for funds will put upward pressure on real interest rates and
attract an inflow of capital from abroad. In contrast, if thecorporate
sector is a relatively small part of the domestic capital market,an increase
in the corporate demand for funds can probably be satisfied withouta
significant rise in the real rate of return and therefore with little effect
on international capital flows and the dollar.
The difference between pretax and after-tax profitabilitydepends on the
corporate tax rate, the depreciation rules, the investment tax credit, and the
rate of inflation. All of this can be summarized by the "maximumpotential
real net return" (MPRNR) that the firm can afford topay to the suppliers of-20--
capital on a standard project.11 In an economywithout taxes, the MPRNR on a
project would be the traditional real internal rateof return. With taxes and
complex tax depreciation rules, the MPRNR is themaximum real return that the
firm can afford to pay on the outstanding "loan" (of debt or equity ora
combination of the two) used to finance the project and have fully repaidthe
"loan" when the project is exhausted.
The standard project for which this calculation is done is a"sandwich"
of equipment and structures in a ratio that matches the actual
equipment-structures mix of the non—residential capitalstock. Because the tax
law specifies depreciation rules and interest deductibilityin nominal terms,
the expected real net return depends on the expected rate ofinflation; a
maximum potential nominal return is obtained using an expectedinflation
series generated by a "rolling" ARIMA forecast (described below)and then the
real MPRNR is calculated by subtracting the average expectedinflation rate
from this maximum potential nominal return. Full details ofthe calculation
are provided in Feldstein and Jun (1986) in which itis also shown that
variations in the MPRNR have had a substantial effect on corporateinvestment
in the part quarter century.
The MPRNR represents a potential net return that the firm can providein
the sense that it takes into account the deductibility of interest payments.
From the portfolio investor's point of view, what mattersis not the MPRNR but
the maximum market rate of return that the corporation can provide.This
differs from the MPRNR essentially in the fact that the portfolioinvestor
receives gross interest while the MPRNR reflects interest net ofthe corporate
deduction for that interest cost. The maximum real return depends onthe mix—21—
of debt and equity that the firm uses to raise marginal incrementsto its
capital stock. If we assume an average ratio of two—thirds equity and
one-third debt and incorporate the average historical standard differencein
the net returns of equity and debt, we can calculate "the maximumpotential
real interest return" (MPRIR).12
The MPRNR measure of real net profitability remained atapproximately 6.0
percent during the years 1973 through 1984 and then rose to approximately 7.3
percent in the early 1980s. The behavior of the maximum potential real
interest rate was quite different. Since nominal interest ratesare deductible
in calculating the taxable profits of the corporation, aone percentage point
decline in expected inflation reduces the maximum potential nominal interest
rate by more than one percentage point and therefore reduces the maximum
potential real interest rate. The MPRIR measure of the maximum real net
interest rate rose significantly between 1973 and 1981 (because of therising
expected rate of inflation) and then came down significantly in the 1980s.
Both variables are studied in the empirical section.
3.4 Expected Inflation
The expected inflation rate has no direct role in a simple model of
exchange rate determination since the exchange rate depends only on the
difference in real rates. However, as Frankel (1979) has emphasized,a rise
in expected inflation may temporarily depress real interest rates(because
nominal rates do not adjust rapidly enough) and therefore theexchange rate.
In addition, financial investors may regard a higher inflation rateas
inherently more uncertain; a government that has allowed its inflation rate to
get to (say) 10 percent may be less able to control it in the future than a—22-S
government that has kept its inflation rate under 5 percent.The uncertainty of
future inflation makes the future value of the currency more uncertain and
therefore depresses the demand for the currency.
The expected rate of inflation is not only unobservable but depends on a
large number of variables: past rates of inflation; past increasesin monetary
aggregates; projected structural budget deficits; changesin energy prices;
the current level of capacity utilization; etc. Although it is not possible
to combine all of these factors to obtain a single operational measure of
expected inflation, the exchange rate equations presented below include many
of these variables. The proper interpretation of the projected structural
budget deficit variable, for example, is therefore a combinationof the direct
effect of the deficit on real interest rates and any effect that operates
through expected inflation and inflation uncertainty. It is not possible to
identify these separate effects but only to quantify the net impact of
expected deficits on the exchange rate.
Although this approach is satisfactory as a general way of dealing with
the effect of expected inflation on the dollar's value, it cannot be used for
quantifying the effect of the tax-inflation interaction on the maximum
potential real interest rate. For that purpose, we require an explicit
year-by--year forecast of inflation over the future life of the standard
investment project. To do that, we estimate a series of first-order ARIMA
models using quarterly data on the GNP deflator with observations through each
year and use these models to forecast future inflation ratesfor the 30 year
life of the standard investment project. The algorithm calculates nominal
values of MPNR and MPIR using the entire set of 30 years of inflation rates.These nominal returns are then converted into real returns by subtracting a
weighted average of the projected future inflation rates.
This "projected inflation variable" (INFEX) is also used as a separate
explanatory variable in the exchange rate regressions to summarize the past
rates of inflation. As an alternative, equations are also presented with a
polynomial distributed lag on past rates of change of the GNP deflator.
3.5 Other Variables
The other variables that are included in some or all of the estimated
exchange rate equations can be easily described.
The basis measure of U.S. monetary policy -in this study is the rate of
change of the monetary base (MBGRO). As an alternative, equations are also
estimated with the rate of change of Ml (M1GRO). Variables like the ratio of
money to GNP or the interest rate would clearly be endogenous in a way that
would be inappropra-ite for the current specification.
For Germany, equations are presented with the rate of change of the
Central Bank money stock (MBGROG). There is however a problem of interpreting
this variable if, as I believe, the Bundesbank altered the growth of its
monetary base in response to variations in the dollar-DM ratio. A strong
dollar and declining mark created potential inflationary pressures that caused
the Bundesbank to reduce the growth of the monetary base, thereby introducing
an offsetting negative correlation between the growth of the German monetary
base and the strength of the dollar.
Much of the financial market discussion of short—term changes in exchange
rates focuses on changes in the pace of economic activity, presumably as an—24—
indicator of future changes in real interest rates. Dornbusch (1983) and
Obstfeldt (1985) also show how changes in domestic demand can alter the
exchange rate by changing the relative demand for domestic and foreign goods.
The current analysis uses the change in real ONP (GNPGRO) as a measure of
economic activity.
Some of the equations also include a dummy variable for the period
beginning in 1980 (DUM8O+) to see whether the effects attributed to the rising
budget deficit are simply due to some other unidentified or unmeasured
character of the period since 1980 such as the altered nature of monetary
policy or the strengthened political "save haven" quality of the dollar.
Finally, some of the equations include the net international investment
position (NIIP) of the United States, i.e., the excess of U.S. investments
abroad over foreign investments in the United States. If U.S. securities are
not a perfect substitute for foreign securities, an exogenous increase in the
net international investment position of the United States should strengthen
the dollar by reducing the demand for additional foreign securities by U.S.
investors Similarly, an exogenous rise in the foreign holding of U.S.
securities (a decrease in the U.S. net international investment position)
should reduce the value of the dollar by reducing the demand for dollar
securities.
Since the NIIP of the United States reflects past current account
deficits, the level of the NIIP will not be exogenous if the residual in the
current account equation or in the equation for the exchange rate is serially
correlated. For example, an increased taste for investing in dollar securities
will strengthen both the dollar and, after a lag, reduce the U.S. net—25--
international investment position. Since the taste shift is unobservable, the
coefficient of the NIIP of the U.S. will be biased upwards toward zero.
Although it would be desirable to develop a more complete analysis of this
issue with which to model the process of portfolio satiation, the current
research settles for only a very simple extension of the basic specification to
include the NIIP variable.
4. A Summary of the Reduced Form Estimates
It is useful to begin with a summary of the estimated reduced form
equations and a commentary on the magnitude of the estimated coefficients.
The individual estimated equations are then presented and discussed in
section 5. The equations relating the exchange rate to the real expected
interest rates in the United States and Germany are discussed in the
section 6.
The dependent variable of all of the estimated equations is the real
dollar-OM exchange rate, defined as the number of German marks per dollar,
adjusted for the level of the GNP deflator of the two countries and normalized
to 1.0 in 1980. This variable declined erratically from 1.21 in 1973 to 0.97
-in1979and then climbed to 1.72 in 1984. Individual annual values are shown
in Appendix Table A-i, together with the annual values of all other variables
used in this study.
The basic equation relates the real dollar-DM exchange rate to the
expected structural deficits as a percentage of GNP (DEFEX), the maximum
potential real interest rate that can be supported by a standard investment—26—
project given the concurrent tax rules and expected inflation (MPRIR),the
rate of growth of the monetary base (MBGRO), and the average future GNP
inflation projected by a rolling ARIMA model (INFEX). To test the sensitivity
of the estimated effect of the expected deficit variable to the specification
of the exchange rate equation, a large number of variants of this basic
specification have been estimated. These variations included omitting some of
the basic variables, replacing the basic variables with other closely related
variables (e.g., replacing INFEX by a polynomial distributed lag on past
changes in the GNP deflator), and adding additional variables.
Several results are very robust with respect to alternative
specifications. The coefficient of the expected future budget deficits is
always positive, substantial and almost always statistically significant. The
point estimate generally varies between 0.25 and 0.40. To appreciate the
magnitude of this coefficient, it is useful to recognize that DEFEX rose from
1.58 (percent of GNP) in 1978 and 1.79 in 1979 to 3.38 in 1983 and 3.33 in
19 4. Comparing the average of the first two years with the average of the
last two years implies an increase of 1.67 percent of GNP. A coefficient of
0.25 implies an increase of the dollar-DM exchange rate index of 0.42 while a
coefficient of 0.40 implies an increase of the dollar-OM index of 0.67. Since
the dollar-DM index rose from 0.99 in 1978-79 to 1.61 in 1983-84, the rise in
the expected budget deficit can account for between two-thirds of the dollar's
rise (0.42/0.62 =0.677)and slightly more than 100 percent of the dollar's
rise (0.67/0.62 =1.08).
The coefficient of monetary base growth is always negative and generally
statistically significant. A negative coefficient implies that a faster—27—
growth of the monetary base depresses the value of the dollar. Thismay be
because an increase in the monetary base temporarily increases theliquidity
of the banking system and therefore reduces interest ratesor, more generally,
because it causes nominal interest rates to decline.Alternatively, more rapid
growth of the monetary base may raise expected inflation or inflation
uncertainty, thereby making dollar securities more risky.
The value of the coefficient of the annual growth rate of themonetary
base is approximately -0.06. Although the implied effect ofmonetary policy
can explain relatively little of the dollar's rise from 1980 to 1984, it does
indicate an important effect during the early part of theperiod. The annual
rate of growth of the monetary base fell from 8.8 percent in 1978 and1979 to
a low of 6.4 percent in 1981. The coefficient of 0.06 implies a rise in the
OM-dollar exchange rate index of 0.144 between theseyears. Since the actual
exchange rate index rose from 0.99 to 1.31, the tighter money can account for
nearly one—half of the observed rise (0.144/0.32 =0.45)from 1978-79 to 1981.
However, since the epxected budget deficit increased during these sameyears
from 1.68 percent of GNP to 2.82 percent of GNP, the implied rise in the
DM—dollar index was about twice as large as the rise impliedby the change in
monetary policy and the two together account for more than the entire rise,
implying that other factors depressed the dollar's value during this period.
By 1984, the annual rate of increase of the monetary base was backup to
8.1 percent, implying that the change from 1978—79 could onlyexplain about
0.05 points of the 0.73 point rise -in the real dollar—OM ratio.
The coefficient of the MPRIR tax variable was frequentlyinsignificant
and generally had the wrong sign (implying that increases in the maximum-28—
potential real interest rate thatresulted from changes in ex ante effective
tax rates depressed the value of the dollar).The coefficient of the MPRNR
variable also generally had the wrong sign but wasalmost always
insignificant. While a negative coefficientcannot be reconciled with the
theoretical expectations, the insignificantcoefficients are consistent with
an earlier finding (Feldsteifl and Summers,
1978) that shifts in the MPIR had
only a small effect on market interest rates,a result that was obtained more
recently (Feldstein, 1986b) in an even strongerform. The small and
insignificant effect of the MPRIR and MPRNR onthe financial variables stands
in sharp contrast to their powerful effects onreal investment reported -in
Feldstein (1982) and Feldstein and Jun (1986).
The insensitivity of the real interest rateand the real exchange rate to
the rate that corporate borrowers can afford to payon a standard investment
project may simply reflect the factthat corporate borrowers represent only a
small part of the funds raised in credit markets.Between 1980 and 1984,
corporate borrowing was only 20.5 percentof the total funds raised -in the
credit markets by all of the public and privatenonfinancial borrowers
combined. Even a substantial shift in the demand curverepresented by this 20
percent need not cause an appreciablerise in the interest rate if the
additional funds are easily attracted from theother borrowers, from potential
savers, or from the rest of the world.
Negative coefficients of the MPRIR andMPRNR variables cannot be given a
structural interpretation. They may represent thecorrelation of this
variable with other omitted variables that depressthe value of the dollar.
While this leaves some residual doubt about theactual impact of the taxchanges, itisimportant to note that including, excluding or changing the
specification of the tax variable does not alter the conclusions about the
expected budget deficit variable.
The inflation variables had a negative coefficient, implying that a
higher rate of predicted inflation (or past inflation) depressed the relative
value of the dollar. This may reflect a failure of the nominal interest rate
to adjust quickly enough to changes in the expected rate of inflation.
Alternatively, if there is a positive correlation between the inflation level
and inflation uncertainty, the higher level of predicted inflationmay make
the dollar a riskier asset for investors and therefore an asset of lower
va 1 ue.
Although the inflation coefficient was always negative, the magnitude of
the coefficient varied substantially from specification to specification and
was not always statistically significant. In interpreting the coefficient, it
should be borne in mind that INFEX rose from 6.7 percent in 1978-79 to 8.1
percent in 1981 and fell to 5.5 percent in 1984. A coefficient of -0.04 on
this variable would imply a decline of 0.06 points on the doiiar-0M index
between 1978—79 and 1981 followed by a rise of 0.10 points between 1981 and
1984. This increase represents about one-fourth of the rise in the dollar-DM
index during those years.
The estimated coefficients of the expected German budget deficits are
always insignificant. This may reflect the difficulty in measuring the German
structural deficit accurately or it may reflect the fact that the close links
among the European economies mean that the dollar-DM ratio is not sensitive to
German deficits p se. Only future work will clarify this. It is important—30-
to note however that the inclusion or exclusion of this variable has
essentially no effect on the coefficient of the U.S.budgetdeficit variable.
5.The Estimated Reduced Form Equations
Table 1 presents the basic reduced form equation and a number of
variations on this specification. In equation 1.1 the coefficient of the
expected deficit variable (tJEFEX) is 0.375 with a standard error of 0.071,
implying that each percentage point increase in the ratio of expected
structural deficit to GNP raises the real dollar-OM index by 0.375 points. As
noted above, the real dollar-UM index rose from 0.99 in 1978-79 to 1.72 in
1984 while the expected deficit rose from 1.68 percent of GNP to 3.35 percent
of GNP. The coefficient of 0.375 implies that the rise in DEFEX accounts for
63 points of the 73 point rise in the index.
The coefficient of the tax variable, the maximum potential real interest
rate (MPRIR) supportable by a standard project, has the wrong sign.I return
to this and to its sensitivity to specification in the equations that follow.
The coefficient of the ARIMA inflation projection (INFEX) is negative but
is only -0.010 and much smaller than its standard error of 0.029. It is
useful to reiterate a point made earlier that this ARIMA variable should not
be regarded as equivalent to inflation expectations since inflation
expectations at any time will also reflect the growth of the monetary base,
the size of projected budget deficits and many other political and economic
factors.
Finally, the rate of growth of the monetary base has a coefficient of
—0.06 (with a standard error of 0.042), implying that a faster rate ofmonetary growth depresses the value of the dollar.
The adjusted R2 of 0.78 implies that the equation explains the variations
in the dollar-OM ratio quite well and the Ourbin-Watson statistic of 1.68
indicates that there is little serial correlation of the residuals.
Equation (1.2) replaces the basic DEFEX variable with the alternative
DEFALT variable (described in 3.1) that was constructed to avoid the
assumption that financial market participants anticipated the large budget
deficits before 1981. The coefficient of DEFALT is 0.385 and therefore almost
identical to the 0.375 coefficient of 0EFEX reported in equation (1.1). The
standard error of DEFALT is however only 0.031 or less than half of the
standard error of the coefficient of DEFEX, reflecting the fact that the
alternative variable has far less "noise in it. This is also seen in the
sharp rise of the corrected 2 from 0.78 in equation (1.1). to 0.95
in equation (1.2). The other coefficients are not changed inany substantial
way. Although the DEFALT seems clearly to be a better variable than the DEFEX
variable, the latter does have the virtue that its construction involved less
discretion and I will continue to present results for that variable.
Because the coefficient of the inflation variable is much smaller than
its standard error, it is desirable to conserve the very scarce degrees of
freedom by reestimating the equation with the INFEX variable omitted. This is
done in equation (1.3). None of the remaining coefficients or standard errors
changes appreciably.
Instead of omitting the rolling ARIMA forecast variable, equation (1.4)
replaces it with a polynomial distributed lag on the annual changes of the GNP
deflator. The distributed lag coefficients are constrained to satisfy athird—order polynomial on six lagged values of the annual rate of change of
the GNP deflator with no restriction on the final weight. The sum of the
implied coefficients is —0.098 with a standard error of 0.082. The monetary
base variable remains essentially unchanged with this respecification. The
coefficient of MPRIR drops to -0.016 and is completely insignificant (standard
error 0.077); this is reassuring since an insignificant coefficient is quite
plausible while a significantly negative one cannot be justified. Finally, the
coefficient of DEFEX drops to 0.254 but remains both statistically significant
and economically very powerful. The corrected 2 statistic of 0.84 shows that
the polynomial distributed lag specification has slightly greater explanatory
power than the more constrained INFEX specification.
Since the MPRIR variable is either insignificant or significant with the
wrong sign, it is useful to see the implications of omitting it from the
specification. This is done in equation (1.5). The coefficient of the DEFEX
variable is 0.234, indicating that the decline in the coefficient value
observed in 1.4 was due to the small size of the MPRIR coefficient rather than
to the change in the inflation variable p se. This specification is clearly
inferior to the previous ones, with a much lower corrected and a very much
lower Ourbin—Watson statistic.
To deal with the low Durbin-Watson statistic, equation (1.5) was reestimated
with a first-order transformation. Since this still had a low Durbin—Watson
statistic, a second-order autocorrelation correction was used. This is shown
in equation (1.6). The DEFEX coefficient has remained essentially unchanged at
0.236 and the M8GRO coefficient has returned to —0.060. The inflation
coefficient is now the same size as its standard error. This variable is—33--
dropped in equation (1.7) where the other coefficients remain essentially
unchanged.
The specification of the MPRJR variable requires assuming a particular
marginal debt-equity ratio and a particular yield difference between equity
and debt. An alternative measure of the effect of changes in tax rules and in
the tax-inflation interaction is to use the less restricted variable MPRNR,
the maximum potential real net return. This alternative is used in equations
(1.8) through (1.10).
Equation (1.8) parallels (1.1) except for the substitution of MPRNR for
MPRIR. The OEFEX variable is essentially unchanged (0.343 with a standard
error of 0.123) while the MPRNR is statistically insignificant, MBGRO is
similar to its earlier value (-0.054 )andthe INFEX variable is now nearly
twice its standard error (—0.070 with a standard error of 0.,039). A first—
order autocorrelation correction actually lowers the Durbin—Watson statistic.
A far better specification is obtained by substituting the polynomial
distributed lag for the INFEX variable (equation 1.10). This combination of
variables has the highest corrected 2 statistic (0.86) and a Durbin—Watson
statistic of 2.48. The coefficient of the DEFEX variable is 0.283 with a
standard error of only 0.075. MBGRO and PDLINF are both negative and nearly
twice their standard errors while the coefficient of MPRNR is satisfactorily
less than its standard error.
Equation (1.11) is similar to (1.1) but constrains the monetary
base growth not to appear- in the equation. Although the resulting
specification is not very satisfactory, the coefficient of DEFEX remains
almost unchanged from equation (1.1).—34-
Finally, equation (1.12) substitutes the rate of growth of Ml for the rate
of growth of the monetary base. The coefficients are generally similar to
those of equation 1.1 but the overall goodness of fit is slightly worse.
A variety of additional sensitivity tests are presented in Table 2.
These tests involve adding several new variables as well as considering some
of the variations discussed in Table 1. All of the results again support the
conclusion that the coefficient of the expected deficit is statistically
significant and economically powerful.
Equation (2.1) starts with the basic specification of equation (1.1) and
adds a dummy variable equal to one for the years 1980 through 1984 and zero
for the previous years. The purpose of the dummy variable is to test whether
the dollar was strong in the 1980s for any of a variety of otherwise
unspecified reasons (the new monetary policy regime that began in October
1979; the Reagan presidency; the increased importance of the United States as
a political safe haven for foreign capital; etc.). If some combination of
omitted variables did indeed raise the dollar in the 1980s above what it would
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largeexpected deficits or to some other variable that distinguished the 1980s
from previous years. Including a specific dummy variable should eliminate
this source of bias.
Rather surprisingly, the coefficient of the dummy variable for the 1980s
(OUM8O+) is negative, about twice its standard error and quite large in
absolute size (about -0.25 ).Thisimplies that the unspecified factors at
work in the 1980s had the effect of lowering the dollar relative to the German
mark in comparison to the earlier years. Faced with the negative coefficient,-35--
it is of course possible to identify possible explanations. Forexample, the
decline -in OPEC financial assets during most of the 1980s reduced the demand
for dollar securities relative to DM securities. The conservativepolitical
victories in Germany and Britain, and the switch in French economicpolicy,
may have revived the demand for portfolio investment in Europe.
The important point to note about these arguments is that theyimply that
the actual rise of the dollar in the 1980s is even moresurprising and that
the combined role of those factors that systematically raised the dollarwas
even stronger. The other coefficients of equation (2.1) show that the primary
effect of including DUM8O+ is to raise the coefficient of DEFEX from 0.375to
0.525.
The DUM8O+ variable appears in most of the specifications of Table 2. Its
coefficient is almost always about twice its standard error and it has the
effect of raising the coefficient of DEFEX to 0.5 or above. Although it is of
course possible that the DUM8O÷ variable is spurious, it is not necessary to
decide this question in order to say whether the rise in the expectedbudget
deficit was an important cause of the increase in the dollar. That isclearly
an implication of the specifications of Table 1 without the OUM8O+ variable as
well as of the equations in Table 2 with the OUM8O+ variable.
Equation (2.2) drops the INFEX variable and equation (2.3) replaces it
with the polynomial distributed lag. Equation (2.4) omits the tax variable
while equation (2.5) switches to the relatively unconstrained MPRNR
specification. Equation (2.6), with no tax variable and with the distributed
lag specification of the inflation variable is one of the -few specfications
in which the coefficient of the DUM8O+ variable is only slightlygreater than—36—
its standard error. In this specification, the coefficient of the DEFEX
variable is reduced to the level of 0.343, approximately its value in the
equations without the DUM8O+ variable.
Equations (2.7) through (2.11) include the annual growth of real GNP
(GNPGRO) as an additional explanatory variable. When the OUM8O+ variable is
not present (equations 2.7 and 2.8), the GNPGRO variable is only slightly
greater than its standard error. The OEFEX coefficients are raised by asmall
amount and the inflation variables are insignificant. When the DUM8O+ variable
is present, the GNPGRO coefficients are quite significant and the DEFEX
coefficients are increased to more than 0.5.
Finally, equation (2.11) adds the net international investment position of
the United States as a percent of GNP (NIIP). Its coefficient is very much
less than its standard error and the remaining coefficients are very similar
to the coefficients of equation (1.7) (which has the same specification except
for the NIIP variable). The statistical insignificance of this coefficient
should not be overinterpreted. As I noted above, the net stock of accumulated
assets may not be truly exogenous since the decline in NIIP in the 1980s has
been the cumulative result of the high value of the dollar and the resulting
current account deficits.13
Table 3 extends the analysis of tables 1 and 2 to include the German
deficit and monetary base variables. For reference, the basic specification of
equation (1.1) is repeated in equation (3.1). Adding the variable that measures
the ratio of expected German deficits to GNP (OEFEXG) and the growth of the
German monetary base (MBGROG) does not alter the other coefficients
substantially but does cause the standard errors to become quite large—37--
(equation (3.2)). The additional variables also leave the corrected
unchanged.
The increased standard errors is perhaps not surprising since equation
(3.2) has six coefficients and a constant term to estimate with only twelve
observations. Dropping the German monetary base variable (equation (3.3)) leaves
the coefficients of the four U.S. variables very similar to the basic
specification of equation (3.1) but with very large standard errors. The
coefficient of the German deficit variable is small and only about one-tenth
of its standard error.
In an attempt to reduce the problem of the large standard errors, these
equations are repeated with the standard U.S. DEFEX variable replaced by the
alternative DEFALT variable in which the observations for 1977 through 1980
are modified to assume that the 1980 deficit-GNP ratio was projected forward
until after the 1980 election. Equation (1.2) indicated that this substitution
leaves the coefficient of the deficit and other variables essentially
unchanged while reducing their standard errors. The effect is similar -in
equation (3.4). The coefficient of DEFALT is 0.414 with a standard error of
0.103. The coefficients of MPRIR and MBGRO are very similar to their values
in equation (3.1) but with smaller standard errors. The coefficient of INFEX
remains very much smaller than its standard error. The coefficients of the two
German variables are again much smaller than their standard errors.
Dropping the insignificant MBGROG and INFEX variables and the MPRIR
variable which has an inadmissible sign leads to equation (3.5) in which the
three remaining variables are statistically significant and have the correct
sign. In this equation, which is estimated after a second—orderautocorrelation transformation, the coefficient of DEFALT is 0.202 (with a
standard error of 0.058) and in which the coefficient of the German deficit
variable is —0.173 w-ith a standard error of 0.087.
This coefficient structure is however quite fragile. Adding the INFEX
variable produces a coefficient of -0.016 with a standard error of 0.013 while
the coefficient of the German deficit variable drops to -0.067 and less than
half of its standard error.
In short, -it seems from table 3 that the German deficit variable does not
have a significant or stable relation to the dollar-GM ratio and that the
decision of whether or not to include it does not alter the point estimate of
the U.S. deficit variable. Future work will be needed to assess whether some
combination of German and other European deficits is significant and whether
its presence alters the coefficient of the U.S. budget deficit variable.
It is, of course, unfortunate that the history of the floating rate
period gives us only 12 years of experience to analyze. Although more data
points could be created by using quarterly observations, I believe very little
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Instead,there would be more measurement error in the "expectations" variables
(DEFEX, INFEX, MPRIR) relative to the actual variation. Looking back before
1973 is inappropriate because the quasi-fixed rate system that existed then
would imply very different exchange rate dynamics and might be expected to
have very different monetary policy responses as countries tried to maintain
their currencies at the fixed parities. Expectations would also be formed
differently in a regime -in which governments were committed to maintaining
fixed exchange rates and in which the United States appeared willing to-39-
accumulate overseas investments or run down its assets in orderto maintain
that fixed rate system.
6. Effects of the Interest Differential
I have already commented in section 2 on the difficulty ofassessing the
structural relation between the exchange rate and the difference inexpected
real interest rates. The expected inflation, which isa very critical
component of the calculation, is difficult to measure and the real interest
rates themselves are endogenous variables.
Despite these difficulties, it is worth devoting some attention to the
estimation of a structural equation linking the exchange rate to the real
interest differential because it is the operational link betweenbudget
deficits and the exchange rate in several analytic models. Theproblems of
measurement and of endogeneity can be mitigated by using an instrumental
variable procedure with the DEFEX, MBGRO and INFEX variablesas the
instruments. The results indicate that the use of an instrumentalvariable
procedure is important and that, when it is used, the evidence showsa
substantial effect of the real interest differential on theexchange rate.
Equation (4.1) of Table 4 presents an ordinary least squares regression
of the the exchange rate index on the difference between the reallong-term
interest rate in the United States and a corresponding reallong-term interest
rate for Germany. The nominal U.S. rate is the yield on Treasury bonds with
five years to maturity. The real rate is calculatedby subtracting the ARIMA
projection (INFEX) from this nominal rate. The nominal German rate in a rate—40-
on long-term German government bonds.14 The real rate -iscalculatedby
subtracting an ARIMA estimate of future German inflation calculated by the
same process used for the U.S. ARIMA forecast of inflation. Annual values of
these variables are shown in Appendix Table A-2.
The coefficient of the real interest rate differential is 0.042 with a
standard error of 0.025. The Durbin-Watson statistic is very low arid the
equation is therefore reestimated with an autocorrelation transformation. A
first-order transformation (equation (4.2)) is inadequate so the final result
(presented in equation (4.3)) has a second-order autocorrelaton correction. In
this form, the coefficient of the interest differential is 0.034 with a
standard error of 0.022.
When the equation is estimated by an instrumental variable procedure
(equation (4.4)), the coefficient of the interest rate differential becomes much
larger (0.082) and more than twice its standard error. The Durbin-Watson
statistic is however very small (0.56). When Fair's method is used to obtain
an instrumental variable estimate with a first order autocorrelation
correction, the coefficient falls to 0.054 with a standard error of 0.023. In
short, the instrumental variable procedure results in a slightly larger
coefficient that the OLS procedure. It might also be noted that these coef-
ficient estimates are similar to the estimates of approximately 0.06 obtained by
Sachs (1985) and Hooper (1985).
Before looking at any further equation estimates, it is helpful to
consider the implications of a coefficient of approximately 0.04 to 0.06 on
the interest rate differential. In 1978-79, the estimated real long—term U.S.
rate exceeded the corresponding German rate by 0.7 percent; by 1983 the—41--
differential was 1.4 percent and by 1984 it was 2.8percent. Even a
coefficient of 0.06 implies a rise in the dollar-DM realexchange rate of
0.042 between 1980 and 1983 and of 0.126 between 1980 and 1984. Since the
actual exchange rate rose by 0.72 points over this period, theequation can
account for at most one-fifth of the actual rise.
The estimated coefficient is far less than theorysuggests. As I noted
above, an increase of one percentage point in the difference between U.S. and
German 10—year real interest rates should increase the dollar-OMexchange rate
by about 12 percentage points, not the 4 to 6 percentage points estimated here
and in previous studies. This implies that the coefficientmay be grossly
underestimated because of the measurement and simultaneity problems referred
to above.
When the interest differential is split into two separate interestrates
and the equation estimated by ordinary least squares, only the coefficient of
the U.S. rate is statistically significant. This remains true when the
equation is reestimated with a second order autocorrelation correction
(equation (4.7)) and by an instrumental variable procedure (equation (4.8)).
However, the combination of instrumental variable estimation and a first-
order autocorrelation correction (Fair's method) does result (equation(4.9)) in
coefficients for the U.S. and German interest variables that are both
absolutely about 0.04 but with the appropriate opposite signs. More
specifically, the coefficient of the real U.S. rate is 0.046 (with a standard
error of 0.024) while the coefficient of real German rate is -0.037 (with a
standard error of 0.024).
As an alternative to the rolling ARIMA procedure, I have also used a-42--
simpler method that may correspond more closely to the way that market
participants used past inflation experience to form judgments about the
future. In place of the ARIMA estimate of inflation, I use a weighted average
of inflation, giving a weight of 0.5 to the most recent year's inflation, of
0.33 to the inflation of the previous year's inflation and of 0.17 to the
inflation of the year before that. On that basis, the expected inflation came
down gradually in Germany from 4.5 percent in 1980 to 4.3 percent in 1981 and
1982 ,3.8percent in 1983 and 2.8 percent in 1984 and real German long—term
rates in the 1980-84 period stayed between 4.0 and 5.0 percent except for a
6.1 percent rate in 1981.
Table 5 presents the results based on this simpler specification of
inflation. The OLS estimates (equations (5.1) and (5.2)) are similar to the
estimates with the ARIMA inflation forecast: a coefficient of 0.055 with a
standard error of 0.035. The instrumental variable estimates (equations (5.3)
and (5.4)) show a more substantial coefficient and smaller standard error of
regression measures than the ARIMA forecast. With the ARI correction (i.e.,
using Fair's method), the coefficient of the interest differential is OO81
with a standard error of 0.031. This is approximately twice the typical
estimate based on the ARIMA inflation forecast. Dividing the interest
differential into a real U.S. rate and a real German rate (equation (5.5))
results in a coefficient of 0.072 (with a standard error of 0.025) for the
U.S. real rate but a very small and statistically insignificant coefficient of
0.003 (with a standard error of 0.032) for the German real rate, possibly
because there was very little variation in the measured real rate for Germany.
In short, the different specifications of the real interest differentials—43-
and the different estimation methods indicate that each percentage point
difference in real interest rates raises the real exchange rate by between
0.04 and 0.08 points, an impact that accounts for only a small part of the
rise in the exchange rate that actually occurred in the 1980s and also only a
small part of the rise in the exchange rate that is predicted by the changes
in the expected budget deficits and -in monetary policy. It is difficult to
tell whether this is because the real interest differential is measured very
badly (causing a substantial underestimate of the true coefficient) or because
the budget deficit and monetary policy have direct effects on the exchange
rate that are not chanelled through the real interest differential.
7.Concluding Comments
The findings of the current research can be summarized briefly. The
estimated reduced form equations for the dollar-OM real exchange rate imply
that the rise in the expected future deficits in the budget of the U.S.
government had a powerful effect on the exchange rate between the dollar and
the German mark. Each one percentage point increase in the ratio of future
budget deficits to GNP increases the exchange rate by about 30 percentage
points.
Changes -in the growth of the monetary base also affect the exchange rate,
but the estimated effect of the deficit does not depend on whether this is
taken into account in the estimation procedure.
The analysis also indicates that the changes in tax rules and in the
inflation—tax interaction that altered the corporate demand for funds did not
have any discernible effect on the exchange rate. The presence or absence ofalternative tax variables did not alter the estimated effect of the budget
deficit.
The estimated effect of the budget deficit is also relatively insensitive
to the other variables that were included in the regression equation.
As I have emphasized elsewhere in a different context (Feldstein, 1982),
all models are "false" in the sense that they involve substantial
simplifications that can lead to incorrect inferences. It is impossible to
relax all of the specification constraints or include all of the plausible
variables in any single model. We learn about reality only by examining a
variety of alternative false models to see which implications of these models
are robust. In the present study, I was eager to focus on the question of
whether changes in the expected budget deficit could account for shifts in the
real exchange rate and, if so, whether this was a spurious relation that was
really reflecting a more fundamental relationship between the exchange rate
and tax rules, monetary policy, inflation, German budget deficits or
unobservable characteristics of the 1980s that strengthened the dollar.
Although any econometric study leaves room for doubt and uncertainty, I
believe that the current evidence shifts the burden of proof to those who
would claim that deficits do not matter or that tax, monetary or "confidence"
variables were the real reasons for the dollar's strength since 1980.
There are of course a number of things that have been omitted from the
analysis that deserve attention in future studies. It would be good to model
the changing behavior of expected European budget deficits or, even
more generally, of the changing balance between the supply and demand for
funds in Europe. There are a number of difficulties in doing so, including—45-
the problem of establishing the "full employment" level at which to estimate
structural deficits in the face of Europe's rapidly rising unemployment and
the much larger and more ambiguous role of public investment in Europe.
U.S. budget deficits have been defined without correct-ion for the
inflation erosion of the public debt on the implicit assumption that, at the
observed rates of inflation, individuals did not adjust their saving but
treated the inflation component of the interest on the public debt as income.
Shifts in the price of oil were ignored in the present study although
they presumably affected the equilibrium exchange rate between the OM and the
dollar. It should be possible to extend the analysis to include the price of
oil and other raw materials.
Finally, in future work I plan to extend the analysis to include 1985 and
the decline of the dollar. The sharp rise in the dollar—DM ratio that
climaxed in the early spring of 1985 may have had some unsustainable
speculative element (as Krugman's 1985 analysis implies) but the decline of
more than 20 percent in the dollar-DM ratio between mid-1984 and the present
time is, I believe, quite in line with what would have been expected on the
basis of the fall in expected future budget deficits.
As participants in financial markets studied the action of Congress in
the spring and early summer of 1985, there was growing confidence that some
significant action would be taken to reduce future budget deficits. The
Congressional Budget Office summarized this in August when it contrasted the
current services deficits of 5.1 percent of GNP each year from 1986 to 1990
with the results of the Congressional Budget Resolution that brought the
projected deficits onto a path that declined to 3.0 percent of GNP in 1988 and—46—
2.1. percent in 1990. The Gramm—Rudman amendment gave the markets even greater
confidence that budget deficits would continue to decline in the future.
The estimated ratio of the expected 5-year structural deficit to
potential GNP has declined from 3.3 percent in 1984 (the last observation in
the sample) to about 2.6 percent at the present time. An estimated
coefficient of 0.25 to 0.40 would imply a decline -in the dollar from this
source alone of between 18 points and 28 points. In fact, as of the middle of
February 1986, the dollar-DM ratio was down 23 points in comparison to its
1984 average value and 32 points from its high in early 1985.
There is substantial room for additional research on the determinants of
the exchange rate. But the massive fiscal experiment of the past six years
should have convinced us that sustained shifts in the Federal government's
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1.On the impact of the dollar's rise on U.S. inflation, see Sachs(1985)
and Sinai (1985).
2. This idea of an induced monetary policy response is discussed -in
Feldstejn (1985, 1986a). This provides an alternative to the Blanchard and
Summers (1985) explanation of the high level of world interest rates.
3. See, e.g., Feldsteir, (1983).
4. This is shown on page 52 of The Economic Report of the Pres-ident for1984.
5.The importance of expected future deficits was emphasized in Feldstein
(1983) and analyzed more formally in Frenkel and Razin (1984), Blanchard
(1985), and Branson (1985).
6.The same criticism also applies to Plosser's (1982) claims thatbudget
deficit's do not influence the level of interest rates.
7.Although measures of the money stock, inflation and real activity have
sometimes been included among the regressors, neither the budget deficitnor
the effect of changes -in tax rules has been included. See Frankel (1979) for
a relatively early study of this form and Hooper (1985), Meese and Rogoff
(1985) and Sachs (1985) for more recent examples; Obstfeldt (1985) provides a—48-
very useful survey of recent research onthis subject. Hooper allows budget
deficits and tax rules to affect the exchange rate as part of a large
econometric model but the estimated effect is only through their impact onthe
real interest differential. Moreover, since Hooper uses only the current
budget deficit (rather than expected future deficits) itis not surprising
that he estimates only a relatively small effect of the deficit on the
exchange rate.
After this paper was written, I received a copy of Hutchison and Throop
(1985); the authors provide a very careful analysis that showsthe
trade-weighted real value of the dollar can be explained by a an equationthat
combines the real interest differential between the U.S. and the major seven
industrial countries and a corresponding one-year expected structural budget
deficit differential. Both the interest rate and the deficit differential are
significant in this formulation. No evidence about monetary policy ortax
policy is presented.
8.A review of the papers that use a "real interest differential" to explain
exchange rate variations shows the potential seriousness ofthis problem. For
example, Frankel's seminal 1979 paper used the short-term German-U.S.interest
differential instead of the long-term differential and measured the difference
in expected long—term inflation rates (a separate variable in his formulation)
by the difference in long-term bond rates. Meese and Rogoff (1985),in an
otherwise very sophisticated paper, also generally use the 3-month interest
rates and when they do use long-term bonds they take the inflation duringthe
most recent twelve months as a proxy for long-term expected inflation.
Hooper's analysis is perhaps most satisfactory but uses only a three-year-49-
moving average of inflation rates.
9.On the induced change in Bundesbank policy, see Feldstein (1986a) and
Feldstein and Bacchette (1986).
10. This is done in Feldstein (1986b).
11. This MPRNR measure is very closely related to the MPNR and MPIR values
calculated in Feldstein and Summers (1978) and updated with some improvements in
Feldstein and Jun (1986).
12. See Feldstein (1986b) for an explanation of how the related nominal MPIR is
calculated. The MPRIR is obtained from the MPIR by subtracting the sameaverage
projected inflation rate used to generate the MPNR and MPIR values.
13.When equation 2.12 was estimated with the stock of foreign private assets
in the United States as a percentage of GNP instead of NIIP, its coefficient
had the wrong sign (positive) and was statistically significant. This again
no doubt reflects the fact that foreign private investment in the United States
grew in the 1980s because of the high dollar.
14. The German interest rate was provided by Data Resources, Inc. and is
identified by Data Resources as RMGBL@GY.-50-
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